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Nuisance law has changed a lot from Horace Gay Wood to
Anthony Palazzolo. The 1893 edition of Wood's treatise on nuisance
law observed that "[w]here water lies upon the surface of the ground
in wet, swampy places, and extends even over the lands of several
proprietors, but has not taken to itself the qualities of a stream so as to
become a water-course, any owner of such lands may, by drains or
other artificial means, exhaust the water and redeem his land from its
swampy condition."' By 2005, though, Palazollo learned that the
water spread across his neighbor's land-now revered as a
"wetland"-would suffer from "increased nitrogen levels" if
Palazollo were allowed to develop his land.2 That harm qualified as "a
predictable (anticipatory) nuisance which would almost certainly
result in an ecological disaster to the pond.",
3
J.B. Ruhl applauds this development. He sees a role for nuisance
law in protecting ecological values that would supplement the
extensive statutory schemes that have taken shape during the past
forty years. Building upon his earlier work exploring how the law
recognizes ecosystem services, Ruhl encourages the courts to
t John N. Matthews Professor, Notre Dame Law School; nagle.8@nd.edu. I am grateful
for the assistance of research librarians Dwight King and Chris O'Byrne.
I 1 H.G. WOOD, A PRACTICAL TREATISE ON THE LAW OF NUISANCES IN THEIR VARIOUS
FORMS; INCLUDING REMEDIES THEREFOR AT LAW AND IN EQUITY 505 (3d ed. 1893).
2 Palazzolo v. State, No. WM 88-0297, 2005 WL 1645974, at *5 (Super. Ct. R.I. July 5,
2005).
3 Id.
4 See J.B. Ruhl, Making Nuisance Ecological, 58 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 753 (2008)
(symposium).
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recognize interferences with ecosystem services as the kind of harms
for which nuisance law provides a remedy.
5
I applaud the recognition of ecological nuisances, too. In doing
so, I begin where Ruhl left off. My earlier writing about nuisance law
is the last source that RuhI cites in his article.6 The thesis of my article
was that nuisance law has long recognized harms that are not familiar
to those who read casebooks that describe nuisances as involving
"polluting smokestacks, corroded tanks leaking hazardous wastes into
the groundwater, barking dogs, noisy trains, and smelly hog
farms. . . . My paradigm case, Mark v. State Dep't of Fish &
Wildlife,8 was a 1999 decision holding that an unfamiliar complaint-
the use of neighboring property as a nude beach-nonetheless
resulted in harms that are familiar to nuisance law, such as fear of
harassment, offense at exposure to public nudity and sexual activity,
and the diminished value of property.9 Like moral nuisances,
ecological nuisances recognize that the requisite substantial
interference with the use and enjoyment of land can be achieved by
surprising means.
In this essay, I use the example of wetlands to illustrate ecological
nuisances. Wetlands are an especially appropriate example because
they are featured in many recent environmental disputes, and because
the societal understanding of wetlands has changed so dramatically
during the past century. On the other hand, a theory of ecological
nuisances is not limited to wetlands. Ecosystems of all types provide
services, and the interference with those services could constitute a
nuisance.
This essay shows how ecological nuisances should be accepted
under longstanding principles of nuisance law. Ruhl makes the same
point, but he approaches the issue from a somewhat different
perspective. Ruhl focuses on the traditional role of nuisance in
protecting economic interests and argues that ecosystem services fits
within that economic model. I want to add to Ruhl's claims by
showing how our evolving understanding of wetlands should yield a
similar evolution in the protections afforded landowners by nuisance
law. Part I describes the swamps that were the bane of societal-
See id. at 777 (explaining that "what I have in mind looks and feels like a rather
conventional nuisance action, the only novel feature being that the plaintiff is linking damage to
ecological resources on defendant's property with injury to use and enjoyment of plaintiff's
property.").
6 See id. at 785 n. 109 (citing John Copeland Nagle, Moral Nuisances, 50 EMORY L.J. 265
(2001)).
7 Nagle, supra note 6, at 265.




including judicial-thought during the late nineteenth century period
when Wood wrote his famous nuisance law treatise. Part II reviews
Ruhl's argument for nuisance law's recognition of the ecosystem
services provided by wetlands. Part III considers how theories of
environmental ethics can aid an evaluation of ecological nuisances
and other legal regulation of wetlands.
I. WOOD'S SWAMPS
Horace G. Wood practiced law, served as a county solicitor, and
was elected to two terms in the Vermont state legislature until an
illness forced him to move to New York City and take up treatise
writing.10 Besides his treatise on nuisance law, he wrote treatises on
such diverse topics as employment law, fire insurance, and the statute
of frauds.ll Those treatises have been superseded by developments in
those areas of the law, but the two volumes that he wrote about
nuisance law remain the leading scholarly treatise exclusively
devoted to the subject.
Wood's "Nuisance Law" treatise covers all sorts of things. Besides
introductory chapters on the nature of private and public nuisances,
the two volumes include chapters on nuisances arising from party
walls, highway obstructions, noxious vapors, noisome smells,
vibrations, and dangerous animals. Water occupies a surprisingly
large portion of the treatise. More than a quarter of the treatise's
chapters and pages discuss nuisances related to water, such as
pollution, interferences with the flow of water, and the right to use
water. Tellingly for wetlands, Wood begins his discussion of
nuisances involving water by observing that water "is the property of
him who owns the land" so long as "it remains in the earth
10 See Obituary, Horace G. Wood, Esq., Peterboro' (N.H.) Transcript, Jan. 12, 1893, at 2.
1 See H. G. WOOD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF LANDLORD AND TENANT: WITH
CoPIous NOTES AND REFERENCES (2d ed. 1888); H. G. WOOD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
RAIL-ROADS (1885); H. G. WOOD, A TREATISE ON THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS (8 vols.) (1884); H.
G. WOOD, A TREATISE ON THE LIMITATION OF ACTIONS AT LAW AND IN EQUITY (8 vols.)
(1883); HORACE G. WOOD, A TREATISE ON THE LEGAL REMEDIES OF MANDAMUS AND
PROHIBITION, HABEAS CORPUS, CERTIORARI, AND QUO WARRANTO (1880); H. G. WOOD, A
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF FIRE INSURANCE: ADAPTED TO THE PRESENT STATE OF THE LAW,
ENGLISH AND AMERICAN (8 vols.) (Albany, John D. Parsons, Jr. 1878); HORACE G. WOOD, A
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MASTER AND SERVANT (8 vols.) (1877). His obituary described
Wood's treatises as "the standard authority throughout the courts of the United States."
Obituary, supra note 10, at 2. The continued value of Wood's treatises is demonstrated by
numerous judicial citations to them. See, e.g., Bailey v. United States, 78 Fed. CI. 239, 262
(2007) (citing Wood's railroads treatise); City of Chicago v. Barettta U.S.A. Corp., 821 N.E.2d
1099, 1110 (I11. 2004) (citing Wood's nuisance law treatise); Brown v. Sabre, Inc., 173 S.W.3d
581, 584 (Tex. Ct. App. 2005) (citing Wood's master and servant treatise).
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intermingled with the soil itself, or while it lies there, or even when
upon the surface in a state of inertia.... ,12
Wood's treatise contains a two paragraph section specifically on
"[s]wamps, and wet, springy places." 13 I have quoted part of it at the
beginning of this article, but it is helpful to consider the entirety of
Wood's teaching on the application of nuisance law to swamps:
Where water lies upon the surface of the ground in wet,
swampy places, and extends even over the lands of several
proprietors, but has not taken to itself the qualities of a stream
so as to become a water-course, any owner of such lands
may, by drains or other artificial means, exhaust the water
and redeem his land from its swampy condition.
The owner of land has an unrestricted right to drain it for
agricultural purposes when the water which it is sought to get
rid of is mere surface water, and has no definite source or
channel; and even though a lower proprietor is thereby
deprived of water which had previously been accustomed to
come to him, he has no cause of action for the diversion.
Neither does the fact that the land drained is wet and springy,
so that in most seasons the water rises to the surface and
flows off upon the land of another, thus supplying him with
water for domestic or manufacturing purposes, make any
change in the right or liability of the owner of the upper
estate, if the water assumes no definite channel, but spreads
itself over the surface of the soil and squanders itself there.14
Wood cited seven cases in support of his assertions about how
nuisance law viewed swamps. In 1870, the New Hampshire Supreme
Court articulated a reasonableness test for the use of water in swamps,
but it refused to afford one landowner the right to insist upon the
continued flow of water that the neighboring landowners diverted. A
contrary rule, worried the court, would "prevent the beneficial
enjoyment and improvement of one's own land," and prevent swamps
from being "drained or reclaimed."' 15 The Rhode Island Supreme
Court reached a similar conclusion in another case involving the
defendant's interference with water that had once flowed to the
plaintiff's neighboring land. The court explained that "in the eye of
12 1 WOOD, supra note 1, at 410-11.
11 Id. at 505.
14 Id. (internal citations omitted).
11 Swett v. Cutts, 50 N.H. 439, 445 (1870).
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the law, as well as of common sense," the water from a swamp is "a
part of the soil with which it intermingles, to be there used by the
owner of the soil, if to his advantage, or to be got rid of in any mode
he pleases, if to his detriment."'1 6 The New York courts shared the
same concerns. According to an 1870 decision, "[e]very person has
the unquestionable right to drain the surface water from his own land,
to render it more wholesome, useful or productive, or even to gratify
his taste or will; and if another is inconvenienced, or incidentally
injured thereby, he cannot complain."' 7 "I know of no principle,"
wrote another New York judge, "which will prevent the owner of
land from filling up the wet and marshy places on his own soil, for its
amelioration and his own advantage, because his neighbor's land is so
situated to be incommoded by it.' 18 The last case that Wood cited,
decided in the English Exchequer Chamber in 1869, upheld a
landowner's "draining off the water for the purpose of the
improvement of his land."' 9
The courts continued to follow that rule in the years after Wood
published his treatise. In 1901, the North Carolina Supreme Court
refused to adopt a rule that "would prevent the drainage of large
bodies of swamp lands of great natural fertility and capable of the
highest degree of improvement, but now worse than useless. They
will eventually be needed to support an ever-increasing population,
and to shut them up indefinitely as the mere homes of disease is
repugnant to the highest principles of public policy and of private
right.' '20 Later in the twentieth century, the same court affirmed that
draining a wetland did not constitute a nuisance at common law.
"Historically," the court explained, "the State promoted dredge and
fill activity . . . for the State generally considered such marsh areas
agricultural wasteland teeming with malarial mosquitoes."
2
'
Most famously, the United States Supreme Court said that "[i]f
there is any fact which may be supposed to be known by everybody,
and therefore by courts, it is that swamps and stagnant waters are the
cause of malarial and malignant fevers, and that the police power is
16 Buffum v. Harris, 5 R.I. 243, 253 (1858).
W7 affle v. N.Y. Central R.R. Co., 58 Barb. 413,422 (N.Y.S.C. 1870).
'8 Goodale v. Tuttle, 29 N.Y. 459, 467 (1864). The other New York cases cited by Wood
were Curtiss v. Ayrault, 47 N.Y. 73 (1871) and Cott v. Lewiston R. Co., 36 N.Y. 217 (1867).
19 Popplewell v. Hodgkinson, (1869) 20 L.T.N.S. 578, 579 (Exch.) (Eng.).
20 Mizell v. McGowan, 39 S.E. 729, 729 (N.C. 1901). See also Gray v. Reclamation Dist.,
163 P. 1024, 1032 (Cal. 1917) (describing the state's draining of swamp lands as an exercise of
the police power for "the abatement of a nuisance in aid of navigation and in reclamation of vast
tracts of state land."). But see Brown v. Campbell, 21 Haw. 314, (1912) (observing in a swamp
drainage case that "[lhand in an insanitary condition or otherwise deleterious to the public health
through natural causes not contributed to by man was not a nuisance at common law.").
21 State ex rel. Rhodes v. Simpson, 385 S.E.2d 329, 332-33 (N.C. 1989).
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never more legitimately exercised than in removing such
nuisances., 22 That statement, from the Court's 1900 decision in Leovy
v. United States, is frequently quoted today to show the old view of
23swamps. But Leovy wasn't a nuisance case. Robert Leovy was a
Louisiana parish official who followed a local directive to build a
dam across a crevasse, and his work earned him a federal criminal
prosecution for violating the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1892. The
Supreme Court reversed Leovy's conviction because the trial judge's
instructions failed to require the jury to find that the crevasse was
navigable water. 24 In doing so, the Court not only disparaged swamps
as nuisances generally, but it also emphasized that damming of the
crevasse dramatically increased the value of the land. Justice Shiras
noted that the contested water resulted from the seasonal overflow of
the Mississippi River, and "by this and similar breaks through the
banks of the river large tracts of land were rendered worthless....
He concluded that "the reclamation of swamp and overflowed lands
was not only not forbidden, but was recognized as the duty of the
State, in consideration of the grant of the public lands" by Congress in
the first Swamp Act of 1849.26
Leovy, in other words, sustained the legislature's decision to drain
swamps, which was the congressional policy beginning in the middle
of the nineteenth century. The Swamp Act passed by Congress in
1849 authorized the transfer of "the whole of those swamp and
overflowed lands, which may be or are found unfit for cultivation" in
27 2Louisiana to the state. More swamp acts soon followed.2 8 The
purposes of such laws were to reclaim "worthless" swamplands for
cultivation, to eliminate "notoriously malarial" lands and thus achieve
"great sanitary improvement," and to increase the value of adjacent
22 Leovy v. United States, 177 U.S. 621, 636 (1900).
23 See, e.g., Robert V. Percival, "'Greening" the Constitution-Harmonizing
Environmental and Constitutional Values, 32 ENVTL. L. 809, 817 n.28 (2002) (quoting Leovy);
Jonathan H. Adler, Wetlands, Waterfowl, and the Menace of Mr. Wilson: Commerce Clause
Jurisprudence and the Limits of Federal Wetland Regulation, 29 ENVTL. L. 1, 19 n. 142 (1999)
(same); Michael M. Berger & Gideon Kanner, The Need for Takings Law Reform: A View from
the Trenches-A Response to Taking Stock of the Takings Debate, 38 SANTA CLARA L. REv.
837, 846 n. 45 (1998) (same); Dennis J. Priolo, Section 404 of the Clean Water Act: The Case
for Expansion of Federal Jurisdiction Over Isolated Wetlands, 30 LAND & WATER L. REv. 91,
92 n. 2 (1995) (same); Stephen Jay Stokes, The Limit of Government's Regulatory Authority
Over Non-Adjacent Wetlands: Hoffman Homes, Inc. v. EPA, 15 ENERGY L.J. 137, 137 n.5
(1994) (same).
24 Leovy, 177 U.S. at 626.
25 Id. at 627.
2 Id. at 636.
27 9 Stat. 352, 352, § I (Mar 2, 1849).
22 See Act of Sept. 28, 1850, ch. 86, § 8, 9 Stat. 521, 522 (granting swamp lands to all




government property.29 In each instance, Congress expected that the
states would invest the proceeds from the sale of the land to private
parties in the "reclamation" of the lands for productive purposes. That
was the idea. Actually, the administration of the Swamp Acts was rife
with fraud. As Benjamin Horace Hibbard explained, "[n]o better bait
was ever thrown to speculators than the swamp lands of the various
states., 30 Besides outright fraud, states quickly adopted a generous
view of "swamp" lands that "embraced the finest and most available
agricultural lands in a locality.",31 The federal government thus
disposed of over 80,000,000 acres of public lands to the states. In
turn, the states gave the land to their counties and to railroads, or they
sold them to private speculators qua settlers. The final irony, as
Hibbard reports, is that "[t]he original purpose of the grant was to
enable the states to reclaim their wet lands by the construction of
levees and drains.... However, no stipulation was made whereby this
form of improvement became a necessary condition for the
,,32
acquisition of titles by the states. In other words, little swampland
was actually reclaimed pursuant to the Swamp Acts.
Swamp drainage occurred in earnest once the states enacted their
own drainage statutes. By 1915, 36 states had enacted laws to
facilitate the drainage of swamps and other watery lands.3 3 Ben
Whipple Palmer identified even more reasons for such state laws than
Hibbard listed for the federal Swamp Acts, citing increased
agricultural yields, improved public highways, more business for
transportation companies and for nearby towns, and "improvement in
29 See BENJAMIN HORACE HIBBARD, A HISTORY OF THE PUBLIC LAND POLICIES 270
(1924). Hibbard's chapter on the Swamp Acts is by far the most helpful in understanding how
the federal government facilitated the draining of swamps, which is somewhat surprising for a
professor of agricultural economics whose other books bore titles such as "Markets and Prices
of Wisconsin Cheese." See also Henry E. Erdman, A Pioneer in Marketing . . . Benjamin
Horace Hibbard, J. MARKETING, Oct. 1959, at 77 (describing the life, career, and achievements
of Benjamin Horace Hibbard). Another excellent source is BEN PALMER, SWAMP LAND
DRAINAGE WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO MINNESOTA (1915), which despite its narrow title
discusses the federal Swamp Acts and provides a thorough summary of the state drainage laws
that I will discuss below. Palmer, like Professor Hibbard, pursued an eclectic writing agenda,
authoring a biography of Chief Justices Marshall and Taney, treatises on courtroom strategy and
condemnation law, and a book of sonnets. See Strangers to Us All: Lavyers and Poetry,
http://myweb.wvnet.edu/-jelkins/lp-2001/palmer.html (last visited Feb. 7, 2008).
30 HIBBARD, supra note 29, at 280.
31 Id. at 279. See also LOUIS BERGAU, SWAMP LAND LAWS: WITH THE INSTRUCTIONS,
OPINIONS AND DECISIONS OF THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR, AND THE COMMISSIONER OF
THE GENERAL LAND OFFICE AND THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES (1876)
(summarizing some of the disputes regarding state selections of swamp land).
32 HIBBARD, supra note 29, at 285.
33 See PALMER, supra note 29, at 32. See also, e.g., Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R.
Co. v. Illinois ex rel. Grimwood, 200 U.S. 561, 563 (1906) (quoting the Farm Drainage Act of
Illinois); Almand v. Bd. of Drainage Commissioners, 94 S.E. 1028, 1029-30 (Ga. 1918)
(quoting Georgia's drainage law).
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public health, due to the elimination of fever and disease breeding
swamps and marshes., 34  For example, Palmer explained that
"[m]alarial diseases prevailed in Indiana and Illinois to an alarming
extent prior to the construction of extensive drainage systems in those
states.,
35
The Swamp Acts and their state counterparts reflected the
prevailing nineteenth century view of swamps. Louis Brandeis and
Charles Warren are best remembered for collaborating on a Harvard
Law Review article identifying a right to privacy, but one year
earlier they wrote another article published in the Harvard Law
Review that disparaged swamps as "a nuisance and a fit subject for
drainage. 3 7  David Miller's study shows that swamps were
characterized "as dark, dismal, and deceitful . . ,38 Swamps were
"associated with disease and death" primarily because of the miasma
theory of infectious diseases.39 Swamps were also regarded as havens
for escaped slaves, as described by Henry Wadsworth Longfellow's
poetry and as illustrated by Thomas Moran's painting. 40 Harriet
Beecher Stowe's second novel, Dred: A Tale of the Dismal Swamp,
considered the plight of an escaped slave living in "[t]he wild, dreary
belt of swamp-land which girds in those states scathed by the fires of
34 PALMER, supra note 29, at 1-2.
31 Id. at 2-3. Palmer cited statistics indicating that the number of deaths from malaria in
Illinois, Indiana, and Iowa dropped six-fold between 1870 and 1890, the period of extensive
swamp drainage in those states. Id. at 3.
36 See, e.g., Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 537-40, 553 (2001) (Breyer, J.,
concurring) (citing Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L.
REV. 193 (1890)); id. at 553 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (same); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479, 510 n.l (1964) (Black, J., dissenting) (same).
37 Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Law of Ponds, 3 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8
(1889). See also id. at 22 (noting that "[t]he swamp is, after all, but 'watery' land, in which the
owner may have the usual right of digging and draining .... ).
38 DAVID C. MILLER, DARK EDEN: THE SWAMP IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY CULTURE 51
(1989). For similar sentiments, see RODNEY JAMES GIBLETr, POSTMODERN WETLANDS:
CULTURE, HISTORY, ECOLOGY xi (1996) (describing the view of wetlands as "places of
darkness, disease and death, horror and the uncanny, melancholy and the monstrous"); THOMAS
JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA 100 (1832) (praising "a common ditch for the
draining of lands"); Harold W. Hannah, History and Scope of Illinois Drainage Law, 1960 U.
ILL. L.F. 189, 189 (quoting a 1941 government report stating that "[g]nats, flies, snakes, and
wild animals infested the tall grasses and the dread black swamp fever was thought to steal out
of these places at night to take toll of settlers and their families").
39 See GIBLETr, supra note 38, at 103.
40 See MILLER, supra note 38, at 92 (quoting HENRY WADSWORTH LONGFELLOW, THE
SLAVE IN THE DISMAL SWAMP (1855)); id. at Plate 4 (reproducing Moran's 1865 painting
"Slaves Escaping Through a Swamp"). More generally, "[t]he American swamp has served
three different military and political functions over the course of its recent history: firstly, as the
first refuge of runaway slaves seeking freedom; secondly, as last resort and base for the white
revolutionary struggling to overthrow imperial government; and thirdly, as the last refuge of
indigenes trying to hold onto their freedom and lands." GIBLE'r, supra note 38, at 214.
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despotism[,] '41 an obvious reference to the southern states that she
condemned in Uncle Tom's Cabin.42 Even John Muir wrote upon his
first visit to a Florida swamp that "[e]verything in earth and sky had
an impression of strangeness[.],, 43 Earlier still, Miller reports that "the
swamp provided the imagery of hell" for Christians ever since the
Middle Ages.44
The draining of swamps resulted in numerous cases in which
landowners challenged the power of the government to mandate the
draining of swamps. Most of these claims failed. According to a 1904
water law treatise:
The health, prosperity, and welfare of a community is largely
dependent upon its freedom from stagnant bodies of standing
water, and from a soil so saturated with water as to render it
unprofitable for cultivation, and deleterious to the health of
persons attempting to live upon it. The creation of conditions
favorable to the maintenance of a large and prosperous
population is an object to which a government may rightfully
direct its attention. . . . Since the drainage of wet and
malarious districts is necessary to the creation of conditions
favorable to the maintenance of a dense population, such
drainage is within the proper exercise of the police power of
the state.45
Alternatively, landowners sought compensation from the government
for various harms associated with the draining of their lands. Those
takings claims failed. The courts also upheld statutes requiring the
adjacent property owners to pay the costs of draining the swamps
because those owners would become the greatest beneficiaries of the
reclaimed lands. According to the Wisconsin Supreme Court, "[t]o
4' HARRIET BEACHER STOWE, DRED: A TALE OF THE DISMAL SWAMP 274 (1856).
42 MILLER, supra note 38, at 56-57 (quoting Stowe). See also Alfred L. Brophy,
Humanity, Utility, and Logic in Southern Legal Thought: Harriet Beecher Stowe 's Vision in
Dred: A Tale of the Great Dismal Swamp, 78 B.U.L. Rev. 1113 (1998) (discussing Stowe's
depiction of Southern legal thinking in her writing).
43 MILLER, supra note 38, at 141 (quoting JOHN MUIR, A THOUSAND-MILE WALK TO THE
GULF 88 (1916)). For a more charitable view of Muir's understanding of swamps, see GIBLETr,
supra note 38, at 240-41.
4 MILLER, supra note 38, at 47.
45 2 HENRY P. FARNHAM, THE LAW OF WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL,
NATIONAL, STATE, MUNICIPAL, AND INDIVIDUAL, INCLUDING IRRIGATION, DRAINAGE, AND
MUNICIPAL WATER SUPPLY 900 (1904). See also Cubbins v. Mississippi River Comm'n, 204 F.
299, 303 (E.D. Ark. 1913) (holding that "every sovereign state has the power to construct and
maintain levees and provide for the drainage of swamps, when deemed necessary for the general
welfare of its people for the protection of the health and property[,]" and noting that "[t]he right
of the states bordering on the Mississippi river and its tributaries to construct and maintain
levees along the banks of said river has been exercised from time immemorial ... ").
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protect the public health and prevent public nuisances, this legislative
interference with private property may be justified, and the
assessment to cover the cost of such work may properly be made on
the lands proportionably benefited and improved thereby.
' ' 6
To summarize, the nineteenth century nuisance cases and other
laws related to swamps teach the following:
1. The harms associated with swamps include (1) an
impediment to higher use of the land for development, (2)
unsightliness, and (3) the spread of malaria and other
diseases, typically due to the presence of mosquitoes.
2. A landowner could not invoke nuisance law to object to
the presence of a swamp on their neighbor's property.
3. Legislative enactments were the primary vehicle for
remedying the harms associated with swamps.
4. The courts relied upon nuisance law to avoid the Fifth
Amendment's duty to pay just compensation to landowners
whose property was subjected to legislatively-mandated
swamp drainage activities.
II. RUHL'S WETLANDS
The swamps of the nineteenth century have been replaced by the
wetlands of the twenty-first century. Wetlands are now regarded as
"an ecological treasure., 47 According to one wetlands treatise:
46 Donnelly v. Decker, 17 N.W. 389, 393 (Wis. 1883). See also Wurts v. Hoagland, 114
U.S. 606 (1885) (holding that a statute providing for the drainage of land, at owners' expense,
after notice and hearing, did not deprive the owners of property without due process nor violate
equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment); Bowes v. City of Aberdeen, 109 P. 369
(Wash. 1910) (holding that the state may, against the will of the landowner, fill in a low lot in
order to achieve proper drainage for an area and may assess the cost to the properties that
benefit from the action providing that public notice and hearing occurs); FARNHAM, supra note
45, at 903 (observing that "[t]he individual has no right to maintain a nuisance, and, as one of
the public, he may be taxed for an improvement which is for the public welfare"); id. at 917
(concluding that "[o]ne man cannot be compelled to drain his land for the benefit of his
neighbor, except where the lack of drainage constitutes a nuisance which may be abated under
the general principles governing the abatement of nuisances"); 2 THOMAS COOLEY, TAXATION
1132 (3d ed. 1909) (discussing "drainage laws, which are enacted in order to relieve swamps,
marshes, and other low lands of the excessive waters which detract from their value for
occupation and cultivation, and perhaps render them worthless for use, and are likely at the
same time to diffuse through the neighborhood a dangerous nuisance") (quoted in Cilley v.
Sullivan, 153 N.W. 773, 775 (Mich. 1915); David Schultz, The Price is Right! Property
Valuations for Temporary Takings, 22 HAMLINE L. REv. 281, 295 n. 42 (1998) (citing cases
upholding the mandatory draining of swamps without compensation).
47 Sabine River Auth. v. U.S. Dep't of Interior, 951 F.2d 669, 672 (5th Cir. 1992).
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Wetlands provide many services and commodities to
humanity. At the population level, wetland-dependent fish,
shellfish, fur animals, waterfowl, and timber provide
important and valuable harvests and millions of days of
recreational fishing and hunting. At the ecosystem level,
wetlands moderate the effects of floods, improve water
quality, and have aesthetic and heritage value. They also
contribute to the stability of global levels of available
nitrogen, atmospheric sulfur, carbon dioxide, and methane.
48
This understanding of the ecosystem services of wetlands is now the
subject of extensive ecological research and policy development.49
Ruhl is one of a number of legal scholars who have sought to
integrate the scientific appreciation of ecosystem services into the
law.50 Much of his writing has sought to apply ecosystem services
within existing statutory schemes, such as the Endangered Species
Act or the wetlands protections of Section 404 of the Clean Water
Act. But Ruhl has also addressed how ecosystem services can
influence the common law. His latest article for this symposium
illustrates how ecosystem services can yield ecological nuisances. 51
Palazzolo v. State52 is Exhibit A for Ruhl's theory of ecological
nuisances. Palazzolo is perhaps more famous as a takings case
decided by the United States Supreme Court, which held that the
state's denial of a permit to fill a wetland might qualify as a
regulatory taking. 3 On remand, the state trial court held that filling in'
4s WILLIAM J. MITSCH & JAMES G. GOSSELINK, WETLANDS 571 (3d ed. 2000) (italics
omitted).
19 E.g., GRETCHEN C. DAILY & KATHERINE ELLISON, THE NEW ECONOMY OF NATURE:
THE QUEST TO MAKE CONSERVATION PROFITABLE (2002); NATURE'S SERVICES: SOCIETAL
DEPENDENCE ON NATURAL ECOSYSTEMS (Gretchen C. Daily, ed.,1997).
50 E.g., J.B. RUHL, STEVEN E. KRAFT & CHRISTOPHER L. LANT, THE LAW AND POLICY OF
ECOSYSTEM SERVICES (2007); Alexandra B. Klass, Adverse Possession and Conservation:
Expanding Traditional Notions of Use and Possession, 77 U. COLO. L. REV. 283 (2006)
(discussing how adverse possession laws protect conservation practices); J. B. Ruhl & James
Salzman, The Law and Policy Beginnings of Ecosystem Services, 22 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L.
157 (2007) (detailing the integration of ecosystem services in law and social policy); James
Salzman, A Field of Green? The Past and Future of Ecosystem Services, 21 J. LAND USE &
ENVTL. L. 133 (2006) (analyzing how we can use law to prevent deterioration of the
ecosystem); James Salzman, Symposium: The Ecosystem Approach: New Departures for Land
and Water: Review Essay: Valuing Ecosystem Services, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 887 (1997)
(highlighting how ecosystem management has been incorporated into environmental law);
Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Markets for Nature, 25 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV. 261
(2001) (discussing the effects of policy and regulated markets on nature).
51 Ruhl, supra note 4. See also J.B. Ruhl, Toward a Common Law of Ecosystem Services,
18 ST. THOM. L. REV. 1 (2006).
52 No. WM 88-0297, 2005 WL 1645974 (R.I. Super. Ct., July 5, 2005).
13 Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001).
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the wetland would constitute a public nuisance and thus come within
one of the exceptions for regulatory takings. The court explained:
Palazzolo's proposed development has been shown to have
significant and predictable negative effects on Winnapaug
Pond and the adjacent salt water marsh. The State has
presented evidence as to various effects that the development
will have including increasing nitrogen levels in the pond,
both by reason of the nitrogen produced by the attendant
residential septic systems, and the reduced marsh area which
actually filters and cleans runoff This Court finds that the
effects of increased nitrogen levels constitute a predictable
(anticipatory) nuisance which would almost certainly result in
an ecological disaster to the pond.54
Ruhl sees Palazzolo as a "simple" and "straightforward" case:
"Palazzolo owned the marsh; the marsh filtered and cleaned runoff
into the pond; those services were positive externalities flowing off of
Palazzolo's property; the public in general enjoyed the economic
benefits of the service; Palazzolo therefore had no property right to
fill the marsh.,
55
Palazzolo is an important case because it shows how ecosystem
services can be infused into nuisance law. Yet Ruhl admits that
ecological nuisances are new to nuisance law. He even says that "one
will search in vain for decisions prior to 2000 applying nuisance law
in contexts anything like those addressed through statutory programs
such as the Endangered Species Act and other ecosystem
management statutes. 56 But there aren't too many decisions since
54 Palazzolo v. State, 2005 WL 1645974, at *5 (emphasis added).
55 Ruhl, Making Nuisance Ecological, supra note 4, at 763.
56 Ruhl, Making Nuisance Ecological, supra note 4, at 756. Naturally, I read Ruhl's
assertion as much as a challenge as fact. The best early case that I found that employs nuisance
law in an ecological fashion is Hampton v. N. C. Pulp Co., 27 S.E.2d 538 (N.C. 1943), where
the court reversed the dismissal of a public nuisance complaint brought by a fishing business
against a paper mill that was polluting the Roanoke River. The court extolled the laws
protecting such fisheries:
The laws of our own State, and those of practically all the states in the Union where
fishing is important, provide against pollution of the streams with matter deleterious
to fish life, require channels to be kept open, or means to be provided by which
migratory fish may ascend the streams. We do not think this is merely to prevent the
common shame of the extinction of an interesting type of river fauna in our time, or
for the sole benefit of the owners of exclusive fisheries. In fact, perhaps the largest
beneficiaries of these laws are those engaged in the business of fishing in common
fisheries. The great fisheries on the Columbia River and of Alaska so conducted are
so extensive that their products are found at one time or another on every table in the
country. Millions of salmon in the open seas near the mouths of these rivers, seeking
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2000 either. Not only is Palazzolo Exhibit A for Ruhl's theory, it's
his only exhibit. This is not to fault Ruhl, for his proposed application
of the Restatement's understanding of nuisance law shows how easily
ecological harms can constitute nuisances. The courts, however, have
been slow to take those steps.
A 2003 New Hampshire decision, Cook v. Sullivan, offers the best
extant illustration of the primary use of nuisance law as informed by
ecosystem services to protect a landowner's use of their land. 57 John
and Diane Sullivan built a house on wetlands next to property owned
by Janice Cook and her family. Cook complained that the Sullivan's
house altered the hydrology so that there was now standing water on
the Cook's land. Cook said that the water interfered with the use of
their land by (1) forcing them to move their dog pens, (2) preventing
them from hanging a clothesline, (3) preventing them from stacking
firewood, (4) causing them difficulty in mowing their lawn, (5)
producing "a strong, musty odor" when water collected under their
chalet's foundation, (6) keeping them from storing things on their
garage floor, and (7) preventing them from using their backyard for
58
recreational activities. The state supreme court agreed that the
presence of the Sullivans' new home in the wetlands constituted a
nuisance. The court even upheld the trial court's remedy of moving
the house away from the wetland.
So far, there are not many cases like Cook or Palazzolo. A more
prominent attempt to employ nuisance law to remedy the destruction
of wetlands in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina failed. Barasich v.
Columbia Gulf Transmission Company59 was a class action alleging
that the oil industry was responsible for some of the injuries caused
by Hurricane Katrina because the industry had damaged the marshes
that protected New Orleans from hurricanes approaching from the
Gulf of Mexico. This claim, too, contains features of a traditional
nuisance case: the property losses and other injuries suffered by the
plaintiffs easily fit within the scope of the harms recognized by
nuisance law, and the defendants' actions allegedly resulted in a
through nostalgic instinct the sweeter waters in which they were hatched, have given
rise to international difficulties and international treaties.
Id at 546.
57 Cook v. Sullivan, 829 A.2d 1059 (N.H. 2003). Christine Klein discusses Cook in her
article. See Christine A. Klein, The New Nuisance: An Antidote to Wetland Lass, Sprawl, and
Global Warming, 48 B. C. L. REV. 1155 (2007) (applying the "new nuisance" law established in
the Supreme Court case Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal).
18 Cook, 829 A.2d at 1067.
19 467 F. Supp. 2d 676 (E.D. La. 2006).
2008]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
substantial interference in the plaintiffs' use and enjoyment of their
land. The court, however, dismissed the claims because the
defendants' activities occurred hundreds of miles away from the
plaintiffs' land, and because the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate the
kind of causal connection between the defendants' activities in the
marshland and the injuries resulting from Hurricane Katrina that the
law requires. The court suggested, though "perhaps a more focused,
less ambitious lawsuit between parties who are proximate in time and
space, with a less attenuated connection between the defendant's
conduct and the plaintiff's loss" would constitute a nuisance.60
Barasich illustrates the limits of an ecosystem services approach to
nuisance law. That pleases James Hoffman, who rejects the notion of
ecological nuisances for two general reasons. 61 Hoffman objects that
the push to recognize ecological nuisances is really a stalking horse to
avoid the Fifth Amendment's just compensation requirements. Recall,
for example, that the actual holding in Palazzolo only saved the
government some money. The state had already employed its
regulatory authority to block development on Palazzolo's wetlands,
so nuisance law was not needed for that purpose. Palazzolo is a
product of Lucas, which encouraged regulators to characterize their
actions as within the scope of nuisance law and thus outside the scope
of regulatory takings. 62 Most environmental scholarship that has
studied nuisance law since Lucas has sought to avoid such regulatory
takings. This desire is understandable, especially because
governments are unlikely to be as aggressive in regulating
environmental amenities if they have to compensate private
landowners for doing so. This desire is also ironic given the role that
the view of swamps as nuisances played in avoiding demands for
compensation for the draining of swamps a century ago.63 But Ruhl
denies that his understanding of ecological nuisances is motivated by
takings clause jurisprudence. 64  Nor is it certain that the
characterization of a land use prohibition as a nuisance will
automatically exempt the action from regulatory takings scrutiny.
60 Id. at 695.
61 James L. Huffman, Beware of Greens in Praise of the Common Law (2007)
(unpublished manuscript, available at http://works.bepress.com/james huffman/2) (arguing we
should not resort to common law principles to protect ecosystem services).
62 See Lucas v. S. C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
63 See supra at text accompanying notes 45 to 46.
64 Ruhl, Making Nuisance Ecological, supra note 4, at 760 (explaining that "my interest in
this regard is not motivated by any particular sense of how large or small the Lucas categorical
takings universe should be"); id. at 763 (stating that "the law of ecosystem services in nuisance
doctrine is unlikely to develop significantly in the context of government defense of regulatory
takings claims-it will emerge only when private landowners and sovereigns start suing over
the adverse effects of natural capital degradation").
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Many public nuisances are prescribed by statute, and the Supreme
Court has never considered whether such legislative prescriptions
qualify as background principles that are exempt from takings law.
The state court's opinion on remand in Palazzolo, therefore, may be
right about nuisance law but wrong about takings.
These are important questions. My suggestion is that concerns
about the proper scope of regulatory takings are not necessarily
coupled with concerns about the proper scope of nuisance law, for
nuisance law plays other roles in preserving ecosystems, as evidenced
by Cook v. Sullivan above.
Huffman also objects to the evolution of ecological nuisances
because they would empower courts to make environmental policy
instead of the legislature.65 The relative merits of environmental
policy making by the judiciary, the legislature, and the executive
branch remains a source of debate among environmental scholars,
with Ruhl articulating a role for each institution as part of his vision
of ecological nuisances. Huffman acknowledges that private nuisance
law raises fewer concerns than public nuisance law because private
nuisance law depends upon the harms suffered by discrete landowners
while public nuisance law invites speculation into the nature of the
rights of the general public. Private nuisance law fits Huffman's
preference for the "demand side" model of the common law driven by
litigants rather than lawmakers.
66
Huffman takes particular offense at Ruhl's suggestion that harms
to ecosystem services could provide the requisite interference
prescribed by nuisance law, public or private. "Harm suffered due to
ecosystem services," writes Huffman, "has always been dammun
absque injuria"-a loss that the law will not remedy.67 Huffman is
right that there have been few ecological nuisances cases, but that
does not mean that all ecosystem harms are novel. To be sure,
Palazzolo is the first case to hold that increased nitrogen levels can
result in a nuisance, though the court's opinion failed to explain
whether such changes also produced a more familiar harm. Moreover,
consider Cook v. Sullivan, where the harms constituting the nuisance
included a variety of prosaic interferences with the plaintiffs use and
68
enjoyment of his land. Huffman confuses the harms with what
causes those harms. The "new knowledge" cited by Huffman may be
used to demonstrate that quite traditional harms have occurred in a
previously unproven way, rather than pushing the courts to expand
65 Huffman, supra note 61, at 9, 14, 24.
6 See id., at 28.
67 Id.
68 See supra at text accompanying notes 56-57.
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their view of what kinds of harms can produce a nuisance. Actually,
the change in cognizable harms occurred a long time ago, when the
courts stopped holding that the fears of swamps justified their
drainage without compensation.
III. ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS
Professor Ruhl is only the most recent scholar to call for the
recognition of ecological nuisances. Indeed, other scholars have
proposed a more sweeping revision of nuisance law than Ruhl
describes in his article. 69 Those proposals often explicitly invoke
theories of environmental ethics to justify their understanding of
ecological nuisances. Ruhl declines to pursue those ideas in his
article, wisely noting that he did not want to bite off more than he
could chew at one time. I am not so constrained. I would like to
examine those proposals and the broader question of what
environmental ethics could teach us about nuisance law, wetlands
regulation, and environmental regulation generally.
Alyson Flournoy has written the most comprehensive overview of
the relationship of environmental ethics to environmental law. 71 She
lists nuisance law's protection of human health, safety, and property
as one of six "ethical impulses" that are embodied in environmental
law.72 She sees this impulse as best explaining the statutory protection
for wetlands provided by section 404 of the Clean Water Act.73
Christine Klein's "new nuisance" is closest to what Ruhl proposes,
though she emphasizes the role of nuisance law in avoiding takings
claims.74 She combines an expanded recognition of externalities with
the research on ecosystem services to craft a theory of ecological
nuisances that she applies to wetlands, sprawl, and global warming.
Eric Freyfogle acknowledges the role of nuisance law in his broader
argument for property laws that are more sensitive to ecological
concerns. He observes that nuisance law both protects and limits
property rights.75 Freyfogle also calls upon the law to incorporate
69 See Klein, supra note 57. See also Robert J. Goldstein, Green Wood in the Bundle of
Sticks: Fitting Environmental Ethics and Ecology into Real Property Law, 25 B.C. ENVTL. AFF.
L. REV. 347 (1998) (discussing how the law and the ecosystem should coincide); David S.
Wilgus, Note, The Nature of Nuisance: Judicial Environmental Ethics and Landowner
Stewardship in the Age of Ecology, 33 McGEORGE L. REV. 99 (2002) (arguing property law
should consider scientific discoveries and take on an environmental ethic).
70 See Ruhl, Making Nuisance Ecological, supra note 4, at 30-33.
71 Alyson C. Flournoy, In Search of an Environmental Ethic, 28 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 63
(2003).
72 Id. at 84-85.
73 Id. at 107.
74 Klein, supra note 57, at 1159-68.
75 ERIC T. FREYFOGLE, THE LAND WE SHARE: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE COMMON
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harms that are demonstrated by new scientific evidence, citing the
example of a farmer draining "a river to grow crops that could be
produced elsewhere with no ill effects. 76 Robert Goldstein argues
that environmental ethics should be employed to reconceive the
common law of property, including nuisance law. He asserts that
nuisance law should recognize that "[a]ctions that were once
tolerable, such as the filling of a wetland, are now deemed
intolerable."" In a student note, David Wilgus built upon Goldstein's
article to develop a new theory of ecological nuisances. Wilgus
argues that "when determining harm within the nuisance context,
courts must be guided by principles of ecology with a sensitivity and
emphasis upon the externalities foisted upon the biological and social
community in which the landowner's activity has its effects.' 78 He
illustrates his idea by suggesting that someone who buys wetlands
"would know courts would allow him to develop only to the extent
that development is consistent with his duty of stewardship. 79
Wilgus does not explain the precise contours of his asserted "duty
of stewardship." There are hints of what this duty could look like
elsewhere in recent legal scholarship, 80  but some of the most
intriguing explorations of the concept of stewardship appear in the
theological literature that has blossomed during the past several
decades. That writing could be an especially appropriate source in the
context of nuisance law, which is the law's institutionalization of the
famous command to "love thy neighbor.",
81
GOOD 17 (2003).
76 ERIC T. FREYFOGLE, BOUNDLESS PEOPLE, BOUNDLESS LANDS: ENVISIONING A NEW
LAND ETHIC 137 (1998).
77 Goldstein, supra note 69, at 422.
78 Wilgus, supra note 69, at 125.
79 Id. at 126 (citing the facts in Good v. United States, 189 F.3d 1355 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
80 See Andrea Patten, Note, Will Regulations Keep Tahoe Blue? Searching for
Stewardship in Property Law and Regulatory Takings Analysis, 27 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 187,
197-99 (2005) (discussing how landowners must evaluate the impact of their actions on the
environment). See also Craig Anthony (Tony) Arnold, The Reconstitution of Property:
Property as a Web ofInterests, 26 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 281, 305-06 (2002) (arguing that
modem view that property is a bundle of rights is the wrong view to take in protecting the
environment); Goldstein, supra note 69, at 352 (arguing that "[s]tewardship involves a
responsibility to the land and an obligation to future generations to preserve the life-support
systems that perpetuate life").
11 The connection between the "love thy neighbor" command and nuisance law has been
made in Mark B. Greenlee, Echoes of the Love Command in the Halls of Justice, 12 J. L. &
RELIGION 255, 266-67 (1996) (detailing the law's application of the love command); Anne C.
Dowling, Note, "Un-Locke-ing'" a "Just Right" Environmental Regime: Overcoming the Three
Bears of International Environmentalism-Sovereignty, Locke, and Compensation, 26 WM. &
MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV. 891, 918 (2002) (discussing the concept of sovereignty within
international law and the theories of Locke). The "love they neighbor" command has also been
cited in other environmental contexts. See John Copeland Nagle, The Evangelical Debate Over
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The Christian ideas of stewardship build upon the twenty-six
references to "steward" or "stewardship" that are contained in the
Bible. 2 Despite this scriptural support, studies of the meaning of
stewardship in the environmental context are of a relatively recent
vintage. Two themes have emerged from these studies. First, God is
the owner of creation. "The earth is the LORD'S," proclaimed David
in the Psalms. 83 This ownership implies that all uses of the creation
are accountable to the desires of the owner-God. Second, God
entrusted humans with the responsibility to care for the creation.
Stewardship is one way to envision that responsibility. The Christian
environmental literature has expressed the job of a steward in
numerous ways. A steward is "a sort of supervisor or foreman, who
must make decisions, give orders, and take charge[,]" 84 or a steward




The common notion is that humans must actively work to manage
God's creation, and that they are accountable to God for the work that
they do.
This general idea of stewardship has given rise to diverse views of
the requisite management responsibility. Consider three particularly
thoughtful, though quite different, views of how to implement
stewardship in the environmental context. According to E. Calvin
Beisner, a theology professor at Knox College, the Bible teaches that
people are creative producers and stewards.86 Beisner asserts that
humans have "subordinate ownership" of the earth, which balances
the biblical teaching that the earth is the Lord's with the teaching that
the Lord has given the earth to man. Beisner holds a high view of
humanity's place in the world, scolding environmentalists for their
"decidedly low view of man." 88 Beisner emphasizes the productive
abilities of humans, and rebukes those who see people primarily as
Climate Change, 5 U. ST. THOMAS L. J. 53 (2008).
82 DOUGLAS JOHN HALL, THE STEWARD: A BIBLICAL SYMBOL COME OF AGE 17 (3d.
prtg. 1982). See also John Copeland Nagle, Playing Noah, 82 MINN. L. REV. 1171, 1226-29
(1998) (discussing the Christian idea of stewardship in the environmental context, although,
much more has been written on the concept since).
83 Psalms 24:1 (New International Version).
8 HALL, supra note 82, at 17.
85 HENLEE H. BARNETrE, THE CHURCH AND THE ECOLOGICAL CRISIS 81 (1972). For
additional images, see ALISTER MCGRATH, THE REENCHANTMENT OF NATURE: THE DENIAL OF
RELIGION AND THE ECOLOGICAL CRISIS xiv (2002) (describing humanity as a steward or a
caretaker).
96 E. CALVIN BEISNER, WHERE GARDEN MEETS WILDERNESS: EVANGELICAL ENTRY
INTO THE ENVIRONMENTAL DEBATE 111 (1997).
87 Id. at I 1 (comparing Psalms 24:1, stating that "[tlhe earth is the LORD'S," with Psalms
115:16, stating that the Lord has given earth to man).
98 BEISNER, supra note 86, at 98.
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polluters. Beisner then asserts that "much of... nature is not good and
should be improved., 89 Combining these ideas, he questions-but
does not say-how to balance the need to preserve ecosystem
functions and the cultivation of farmland.90 He favors the use of
market systems as the best means of achieving human flourishing and
of stewarding the natural creation. He also advises that "honest
Christians will disagree on both the moral question of what
constitutes injustice and the practical questions of which societal
structures damage the ecosphere and why, and of how best to go
about reforming those that do." 9'
Norman Wirzba criticizes the views represented by Beisner for
using an economic agenda to define stewardship.92 Wirzba, a
philosophy professor at Kentucky's Georgetown College, insists that
stewardship is not radical enough to capture the totality of Christian
teaching about creation. He prefers "the image of the servant of
creation. . . ,93 "Servants suspend their own desires," explains
Wirzba, "not out of tyrannical pressure or the loss of self-worth, but
so that the flourishing of others and the whole creation can occur.
This is a unique capacity that is unparalleled in any other species." 94
Stated affirmatively, Wirzba encourages servants of creation to
become "the patient and earnest students of creation" to make room
for other creatures and for wildness, and to cultivate resources whose
exploitation treads more gently upon the earth.95
Hope College Professor Steven Bouma-Prediger has written the
most comprehensive survey of the multiple perspectives represented
by Christians who have studied environmental issues.96 Bouma-
Prediger reviews ten arguments for why we should care for the earth:
our self-interest, the interests of future generations, joyful simplicity,
ecojustice, the intrinsic value of the earth, the earth community's
89 Id. at 12 (emphasis omitted).
90 Id. at 36.
91 Id. at 39.
92 NORMAN WIRZBA, THE PARADISE OF GOD: RENEWING RELIGION IN AN ECOLOGICAL
AGE 130-32 (2003).
93 Id. at 135.
94 Id. at 140.
95 Id. at 146. Wirzba, of course, is not the only writer to take issue with the idea of
stewardship. See, e.g., JOHN HART, SACRAMENTAL COMMONS: CHRISTIAN ECOLOGICAL ETHICS
70, 119-21 (2006) (contrasting domination, dominion, stewardship, and relational models);
John L. Paterson, Conceptualizing Stewardship in Agriculture within the Christian Tradition, 25
ENVTL. ETHICS 43, 44 (2003) (noting that "the ethic of stewardship has also been attacked in a
number of circles, for its uncritical anthropocentrism, homocentrism, silences on issues of
poverty and hunger, and its association with the conservative agrarian myth of the family
farm").
96 STEVEN BOUMA-PREDIGER, FOR THE BEAUTY OF THE EARTH: A CHRISTIAN VISION FOR
CREATION CARE (2001).
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interdependence, divine command, our creation in the image of God,
and our grateful heart.97 For Bouma-Prediger, gratitude "is the most
compelling reason to care for the earth., 98 He also lists a series of
ecological virtues, matching respect and receptivity, self-restraint and
frugality, humility and honesty, wisdom and hope, patience and
serenity, benevolence and love, and justice and courage (along with a
list of their corresponding vices). 99 Moving closer to the influences
upon environmental law, Bouma-Prediger charts how Christian
teaching can be found within theories of the rights of future
generations, animal rights, biocentrism, the wilderness movement, the
land ethic, and deep ecology. 00 Bouma-Prediger endorses the land
ethic, which "captures much of the wisdom of Scripture, and is
attuned to how the world works." 101 He would, however, add several
features to the existing understanding of the land ethic. He would be
sure that a land ethic also includes the water, he would protect
"certain basic human rights," and he concludes that "a hierarchy of
values is necessary."'
0 2
The very richness and diversity of these perspectives-not to
mention others that I do not have time to survey here-do not dictate
a single way of integrating environmental ethics into law. They do not
specifically address wetlands or nuisance law. Yet they may help
environmental law to adopt a fuller appreciation of the role of
wetlands both within the ecological community and human societies.
The Christian vision of stewardship suggests three types of harms
to wetlands that may be within the cognizance of nuisance law. First,
it affirms a responsibility to care for the ecosystems that God created.
Indeed, the ethical arguments in these writings often simply mimic
the language of ecosystem services. Here the religious argument
offers another justification for recognizing the harms that Professor
Ruhl documents so well in his article.
A second type of harm is aesthetic. Nuisance law struggled with
aesthetic injuries for a long time, but the modem view accepts that
interference with a landowner's aesthetic interests can result in a
nuisance. For example, in a recent case involving a nuisance created
by the intentional placement of numerous unsightly objects next to
the plaintiffs beachfront property, the Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court observed that that "aesthetic considerations" and
97 Id. at 163-79.
98 Id. at 178.
99 Id. at 141-59.
'00Id at 127-32.
101 Id. at 131.
102 BOUMA-PREDIGER, supra note 96, at 133-34.
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"incorporeal, value-based interferences" can give rise to a nuisance. 103
The court added that it should "interpret broadly one's right to use
and enjoy his or her land."' 1 4 The Christian environmental literature
supports the importance of the aesthetic value of the natural
environment. Professor Bouma-Prediger's book is entitled "For the
Beauty of the Earth," and numerous other writers have emphasized
that natural beauty is one of the leading values of the environment.10 5
This is a much different perspective than the nineteenth century view
of wetlands as unattractive and threatening, for it affirms the beauty
in all that God created.
A third type of harm involves the interference with the sacred
quality or spiritual values of particular lands. Wetlands may be
sacred. For example, the bureau administering the Ramsar
Convention-the international treaty protecting designated
wetlands-has published a pamphlet on "Wetlands and spiritual life"
that records that "people's belief systems have, from earliest times,
commonly considered water and wetlands to be sacred[,]" and "this
sacramental relationship between people and wetlands is still in
evidence today in many parts of the world." 1°6 Likewise, the
supporters of the Wilderness Act identified multiple spiritual values
of wilderness during the lengthy debates preceding the congressional
approval of that law in 1964.107 An activity that compromises such
values could qualify as an interference with the landowner's use and
enjoyment of the land. There have not been any such nuisance cases,
though there have been repeated disputes regarding the federal
government's management of sacred sites on public lands.
These values add to the arsenal of interests that can be protected
by nuisance law (and by environmental law more generally). A
recognition of the many values of wetlands, though, does not really
103 Rattigan v. Wile, 841 N.E.2d 680, 689-90 (Mass. 2006) (citing Nagle, supra note 6, at
276-99).
'04 Id. at 688.
105 See BOUMA-PREDIGER, supra note 96. See also MCGRATH, supra note 85, at 16
(proclaiming that "[tihe beauty of the world ... reflects the beauty of God"); J. MATTHEW
SLEETH, SERVE GOD, SAVE THE PLANET 206 (2006) (quoting John Calvin's observation that
"[i]n grasses, trees, and fruits, apart from their various uses, there is beauty of appearance and
pleasantness of odor").
106 THE RAMSAR BUREAU, WETLANDS AND SPIRITUAL LIFE 1 (2007),
http://www.ramsar.org/info/cultural-heritagee09.pdf. See also ARUN KUMAR ET AL.,
HANDBOOK ON INDIAN WETLAND BIRDS AND THEIR CONSERVATION 365-66 (2005) (describing
sacred wetlands in India); Gonzalo Oviedo, Sally Jeanrenaud & Mercedes Otegui, Protecting
Sacred Natural Sites of Indigenous and Traditional Peoples: An IUCN Perspective 10 (June
2005), http://www.iucn.org/themes/spg/Files/sacred%20sites/protecting-sacred-natural-sites-
indigenous.pdf (describing sacred wetlands in West Africa).
107 See John Copeland Nagle, The Spiritual Value of Wilderness, 36 ENVTL. L. 955, 978-
87 (2005) (reviewing the congressional hearing testimony).
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grapple with the practical question of when a wetland should be
modified or destroyed. The writings discussed above could imply that
a steward will not ever destroy a wetland, regardless of the nature of
the wetland or the activity that would destroy it. In the law's
vocabulary, they would regard the destruction of a wetland as a
nuisance per se. So far, though, environmental law has been unwilling
to prohibit all development in wetlands. Section 404 of the Clean
Water Act prohibits the filling in of wetlands without a permit, but
permits are nearly always forthcoming.10 8 Perhaps landowners should
be given greater incentives to preserve wetlands, or perhaps a more
stringent regulation should be imposed. For purposes of nuisance law,
what is needed is an environmental ethic that is capable of judging
which activities are reasonable, and of distinguishing among
developments and among wetlands.
That is where nuisance law turns to the other side of the balance.
As Professor Ruhl explains, the Restatement test weighs the gravity
of the harm suffered by the plaintiff against the utility of the
defendant's conduct. The utility of the conduct, in turn, considers the
social value of the conduct, its suitability for the location, and
whether the harm may be prevented or avoided. So is the destruction
of wetlands a socially valuable activity? We quickly say "no" today,
but our ancestors had a much different response throughout the
nineteenth century and well into the twentieth century. That is partly
because we now appreciate the ecosystem services of wetlands, but it
is also because we no longer feel threatened by them. In other parts of
the world, though, some wetlands are still viewed as a threat to public
health. Elizabeth Willott, a University of Arizona entomologist,
insists that we must "address the reality that restoring or creating
wetlands has a downside."' 0 9 Willott recounts the history of the
devastating effects of malaria spread by mosquitoes, and how swamp
drainage policies responded to those concerns. For example, "[t]he
swampy area south of Toledo, Ohio was considered almost
uninhabitable due to disease, presumably malaria, until most of the
swamp was drained between 1870 and 1920." Willott adds that
wildlife species are threatened by diseases spread by mosquitoes, too.
The challenge, she explains, is "to know how we can control
mosquito populations when diseases spread by mosquitoes unduly
1°'33 U.S.C. § 1344(a). See Allyson C. Flournoy, Section 404 at Thirty-Something: A
Program in Search of a Policy, 55 ALA. L. REv. 607, 644 (2004) (citing a study indicating that
99% of section 404 permits were granted between 1992 and 2001).




threaten us or desired local species.""l 0 To do so, Willott calls for
greater research into the problem and for continuous monitoring of
restored wetlands.
This is not to say that wetlands are nuisances. To be sure, a
number of early cases held that the maintenance of standing water
where mosquitoes bred constituted a nuisance. 1 ' More recently, in
the context of a very twenty-first century nuisance claim against gun
manufacturers, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court listed "the
maintenance of a pond breeding malarial mosquitoes" as an example
of a "traditional public nuisance [case]." 1 2 But not all wetlands are
the source of mosquitoes, and there are other ways of controlling both
mosquitoes and disease than draining wetlands. The availability of
such alternatives to mosquito control is relevant under the
Restatement's conception of the utility of a defendant's interference
with a wetland. Further, even though wetlands are not themselves
nuisances, nuisance law will consider the social value of eliminating a
particular wetland that hosts mosquitoes that threaten public health.
So far, little of the legal scholarship that has worked to integrate
environmental ethics into environmental law has grappled with such
problems. The Christian environmental literature has been especially
likely to struggle with the place of humans in the natural world. It is
closely suited to nuisance law's effort to identify the appropriate
balance between competing claims of neighboring landowners. But
any weight given to human interests in modifying wetlands elicits the
most common complaint against Christian perspectives on the
environment, to wit, that they are too anthropocentric. In his famous
1969 essay, Lynn White blamed Christianity for the emerging
environmental crisis because it was "the most anthropocentric
religion the world has seen."" 3 The Christian environmental literature
since then has acknowledged responsibility for prior destructive
attitudes toward nature, while correcting White's historical claim that
such destruction was uniquely attributable to Christianity. This
literature also engages the anthropocentric claim, with some Christian
writers embracing it, others insisting that the proper understanding of
Christian teaching is biocentric, and some preferring the label
110 Id at 151.
ME.g., Birmingham Waterworks Co. v. Martini, 56 So. 830 (Ala. Ct. App. 1911);
Towaliga Falls Power Co. v. Sims. 65 S.E. 844 (Ga. Ct. App. 1909); McFadden v. Missouri, K.
& T. Ry. Co. of Texas, 92 S.W. 989 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App. 1906).
M Jupin v. Kask, 849 N.E.2d 829, 843 (Mass. 2006) (quoting Stop & Shop v. Fisher, 444
N.E.2d 368 (Mass. 1983)).
1 Lynn White, Jr., The Historical Roots of Our Ecologic Crisis, 155 SCIENCE 1203, 1205
(1967).
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theocentric.1 4 Whatever the appellation, these writers seek to
navigate the claims of humans and the claims of the rest of God's
creation.
These efforts are of particular value for nuisance law. Nuisance
law is unabashedly anthropocentric: it cares about an individual's use
and enjoyment of their land, but nuisance law accepts that moral or
ethical beliefs can influence what constitutes such interference. So
while nuisance law does not advance any substantive judgment
regarding the propriety of someone frolicking naked on the beach,
nuisance law does recognize that a sufficiently common moral
objection to such conduct can interfere with the use and enjoyment of
neighboring property. Or, to cite the other hypothetical examples that
I offered in my earlier article, moral objections to drug dealing,
prostitution, or hunting could yield a cognizable nuisance case in
certain circumstances.' 5 Environmental ethics can inform nuisance
law in the same way.
The other Restatement factor in judging the utility of destroying a
wetland is the location of the defendant's activity. It may be tempting
to say that no development is appropriate in wetlands given their
many values, but a similar list of ecosystem services and other values
can be produced for forest, estuaries, deserts, and every other type of
ecosystem. Instead, remember that all wetlands are not created equal.
Different wetlands in different locations provide different amounts of
ecosystem services. As Professor Ruhl notes, "[e]cological
economists have developed the concept of critical natural capital
(also CNC) to identify ecological resources that provide important
ecosystem services and which are least amenable to substitution."' 
6
An activity that interferes with a wetland that possesses such CNC is
least suited for that location.
The contrasting views of wetlands as contributors to public and
ecological health, and wetlands as threats to public health, demands
the kind of balancing for which nuisance law excels. A landowner
should be able to demonstrate specific ecosystem services or other
values that would be disrupted by the defendant's destruction of a
114 See, e.g., WIRZBA, supra note 92, at 133 ("Anthropocentrism, the refusal to understand
ourselves as but one part of a larger created whole, is the central sin."); McGRATH, supra note
85, at 54 (arguing that secular twentieth century culture, as rooted in the Enlightenment, is the
most anthropocentric religion the world has ever seen). Discussions of anthropocentrism appear
in much of the legal scholarship addressing environmental ethics, too. See FREYFOGLE, supra
note 76, at 31; Flournoy, supra note 71, at 77; Erin Englebrecht, Three Fallacies of the
Contemporary Legal Concept of Environmental Injury: An Appeal to Enhance "One-Eyed
Reason with a Normative Consciousness ", 18 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 28-37.
"
5 See Nagle, supra note 6, at 316-19.
116 Ruhl, supra note 4, at 775.
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wetland, and the defendant should be able to counter with any
evidence that modification of the wetland is necessary for an
important purpose such as public health. This kind of individualized
assessment of environmental and property disputes is praised by Tony
Arnold, who has observed that "[n]ot all parcels of land are the same
and therefore should not necessarily come with uniform rights and
duties."' 7
Yet the individualized assessment provided by nuisance law is not
a panacea for wetlands regulation. Ethical norms are more readily
incorporated into statutory provisions that are crafted with particular
goals in mind: Existing wetlands law, however, is not animated by
clear ethical norms.'1 8 The current debate over the future of wetlands
law in the aftermath of the Supreme Court's decision in Rapanos1 9
would benefit from a more direct discussion of what our society
expects from wetlands and how it wants to treat them.
There is one more ethical principle that could aid that discussion.
Humility is not often associated with governmental regulation, but
each of the three writers whom I mentioned above noted the
importance of humility in formulating and implementing
environmental ethics. For Professor Beisner, humility should cause us
to be cautious in managing ecosystems.' 20 For Professor Wirzba,
humility is one of the foremost virtues that come from caring for the
earth. 121 For Professor Bouma-Prediger, humility "is the proper
estimation of one's abilities or capacities. It is the fitting
acknowledgment that we humans are earth creatures." 12 2 It means we
should "[a]ct cautiously."'' 23 Again, it is unclear precisely what that
means when balancing the conflicting societal desires for wetlands,
but it suggests that our new understanding of ecosystem services
should be accompanied by an appreciation of other values, perhaps
including some of the oft-discredited ideas of the nineteenth century.
117 Arnold, supra note 80, at 319. Arnold adds that "[p]roperty law must also consider the
natural uses and functions of the particular land or natural resource, and maintain the integrity of
the ecosystem that the land or resource serves." Id. at 319-20.
18 See Flournoy, supra note 71, at 103 (concluding that CWA section 404 "presents a
particularly difficult challenge for the scholar trying to unravel its ethical roots because of the
extensive sources that comprise it").
"9 Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715 (2006).
120 See BEISNER, supra note 86, at 28.
121 WIRZBA, supra note 92, at 31.
122 BOUMA-PREDIGER, supra note 96, at 147.
123 Id. (emphasis omitted).
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CONCLUSION
Eric Freyfogle has written that "Americans are much in need of a
more poetic sense of the land, a sense of its organic wholeness and
beauty; its inner motion and energy, its subtle music and spirituality.
To tend the land wisely is not just to use it efficiently; it is to
recognize the land's sacredness and show it due respect."' 24 Freyfogle
has also called for greater humility with respect to the land. 25
Nuisance law fits into that framework by honoring the expectations of
neighboring landowners as they struggle to balance their new
appreciation of the land with their desires to use the land. Ecological
nuisances build upon the flexible history of nuisance law's response
to such changes. Ecological nuisances should not be the law's only
response to the study of ecosystem services, but they offer a valuable
tool that is available to individual landowners as they continue to
work out their own understanding of the ethical values of their land.
124 Freyfogle, supra note 76, at 173.
125 See id. at 35.
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